The purpose of this paper is two-fold; to examine developments in trade and investment policy regimes in Malaysia following the on-set of the financial crisis, using the Trade Policy Review Malaysia 2001 of the WTO as a reference point; and to evaluate the Review in terms of the objectives of the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism as set out in the Marrakesh Agreement. It is found that, by and large Malaysia has managed to come out of the crisis without compromising on its long-standing commitment to maintaining a relatively open trade and investment policy regime by the regional standards. However, there are some disturbing post-crisis developments, which deserve scrutiny in a future Review. These include increase in the degree of dispersion of tariff rates because of high tariff peaks relating to a few product lines, increased reliance on non-automatic import licensing to regulate imports of a significant number of products which directly compete with domestic production by public sector enterprises, and unexplained delays in meeting commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
The TPRM was first established at the GATT Secretariat on a trial and error basis in April 1988 as a key accomplishment of the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round. It was subsequently incorporated into the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation. Under the GATT the focus of TPRM was limited only to policies and practices governing commodity trade. Under the WTO the focus was extended to cover trade in services and trade related aspects of intellectual property rights. For details on the modalities, operation and the challenges faced by the TPRM see Keesing 1998 , Blakehurst 1999 and Laird 1999 developed countries. By June 2002, a total of 149 reviews had been conducted covering 77 WTO member countries.
As a middle-ranking trading nation, Malaysia is on the four-year review circle.
The 2 The two previous reviews were conducted in 1990 and 1996. 2.
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA: AN OVERVIEW 3 Malaysia is considered as one of the great development success stories in the developing world. While Malaysia's economic performance was impressive by developing-country standards over the entire four decades of independence, the achievements were particularly impressive in the decade before the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. During this period Malaysia had one of the highest growth rates (about 9 per cent per annum) in the world (Figure 1 ). Sustained rapid growth was accompanied by a dramatic decline in the rate of unemployment and rising living standards, and remarkably low inflation. The financial crisis severely disrupted the Malaysian economy and in 1998
real GDP contracted by a staggering 7.5. But, with the help of an unorthodox policy package, which provided for expediting recovery though reflationary macroeconomic policy without deviating from the country's commitment to liberal trade and foreign direct investment policies, the economy recovered quickly, regaining the pre-crisis growth momentum by 2000.
Figure 1 about here (a) Economic Performance
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the economic expansion in Malaysia was predominantly accounted for by primary sectors. Malaysia's achievements during this period included reaching agricultural food self-sufficiency by the mid-1970s, maintaining its supremacy in the world natural rubber market by remarkable improvement in efficiency of production through a replanting scheme, and reduction in the vulnerability of the plantation sector to vagaries of the world rubber prices by successful diversification into palm oil and coco. From the late 1980s, much of growth has come from the expansion of manufacturing. Between 1987 and 1997, the manufacturing sector grew at an average annual rate of 14 percent, almost double the rate of expansion achieved in the previous ten years. The share of manufacturing in GDP increased from about 20 percent to over 34 percent during this period, contributing to over 50 percent of the increment in GDP.
In addition, much of output expansion in the tertiary (service) sectors in recent years has been closely related to the expansion of the manufacturing sector. The share of the agriculture in GDP declined from over 20 per cent in the mid-1980s to less than 9 per cent by the turn of the century, when the economy started to face severe labour shortages (Table 1) . From about the mid-1990s, the export composition began to diversify into mature technology final products such as radios, TVs, cameras and computers. But by the turn of the century semiconductors and other electronics components still accounted for over 45
per cent of total merchandise exports. Most of these 'products' consist of simple assembly operations, although some electronics firms have entered into higher value added fabrication and design activities. From the late 1980s Malaysia has been the largest developing-country exporter (and one of the world's major exporters) of electronic components, particularly integrated circuits. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a pivotal role in export-led industrialisation. Foreign firms accounted for over 45 percent of total manufacturing value added and over three-quarters of total manufactured exports by the mid-1990s exports (Athukorala and Menon 1999) .
Rapid export-led growth was accompanied by a persistent decline in the unemployment rate, which had reached a peak of 8.5% by the mid 1980s. By the mid 1990s the Malaysian economy was at virtual full-employment, with an unemployment rate of only 2.8 percent (Figure 1 ). The strong expansion of modern sector employment, the decline in unemployment and, more recently increasing wages, in turn contributed to reduction of poverty and promotion of equity. The incidence of poverty among all households (as measured by the percentage of total households below the poverty line)
fell from 18.4 percent in 1984 to 0.6 percent in 1997. A significant decline was observable for both urban and rural households, even though the incidence of poverty was still relatively high in rural areas. Following the onset of the financial crisis, the unemployment rate rose to 3.3% in 1998, but declined to the pre-crisis level by 2000, without leaving any discernable impact on impressive record of poverty reduction. While Of course, Malaysia had some initial advantages such as rich and diversified natural resource endowment, and well-developed infrastructure and an efficient administrative mechanism inherited from the colonial era. Subsequently
Malaysia also greatly benefited from it geography, the location in a high growth region.
But these non-policy factors were not unique to Malaysia. At the same time, Malaysian policy makers had to face formidable challenges arising from a pluralistic society characterised by deep ethnic division and unequal distribution of income and wealth along ethnic lines. 5 The consensus view of various recent prognoses of the Malaysian economic success is that the key to success was sound economic policy (Bhalla and Kharas 1992 , Selleh and Meyanathan 1993 , Snodgrass 1995 , Athukorala and Menon 1999 . The Malaysian development policy reflects a unique combination of outwardoriented development strategy 6 and a comprehensive affirmative action program aimed at maintaining ethnic harmony and social stability.
(b) Policy Trends
Like in many other developing countries, industrialisation through import substitution was a key emphasis of the Malaysian development strategy in the 1950s and 1960s (Alavi 1996) . But Malaysian policy makers, unlike their counterparts in other countries, never resorted to non-tariff protection and direct government involvement in manufacturing through setting up of public sector enterprises as means of 'promoting' industrialisation.
Moderate tariff protection was by and large the key instrument used in encouraging new investment in manufacturing. Tariff protection to domestic manufacturing in Malaysia has also been low relative to other developing countries (Power 1971) . The role of the government was by and large limited to the provision of conventional public services and implementation of rural development schemes. As already noted, unlike in most other developing countries, there was no direct government involvement in manufacturing though the establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Economic expansion during the 1950s and the 1960, although respectable, failed to make a substantial contribution towards solving the "special" problems of the Malays.
With urban unemployment rising, and education and language again looming as issues, non-Malays began to question the extent to which their interests were being safeguarded 5
At the time of independence, the native Malays, who accounted for 52 percent of the population, were relatively poor and involved mostly in low-productive agricultural activities. The ethnic Chinese (37 percent of the population) enjoyed greater economic power and dominated most of the modern-sector activities. 6 In a recent comprehensive study of the patterns and chronology of trade policy reforms during the postwar era, Sachs and Warner (1995, in the new Malaysia. The disenchantment growing among all segments of the population ultimately erupted in the bloody communal riots of 13 May 1969. This event gave birth to a weeping affirmative action policy, the New Economic Policy (NEP), which came into effect in 1970 (later modified and renamed National Development Policy, NDP, in 1990) (Leigh 1992 , Snodgrass 1995 . The overriding objective of NEP was to maintain national unity through the pursuance of two objectives: eradication of poverty among the entire population and restructuring of the Malaysian society so that the identification of race with economic function and geographical location is reduced. These objectives were to be ached through a wide range of direct redistribution polices including privileged access to subsidised credits, modern sector employment, and share ownership in private enterprises for the native Malays (Bumiputra). But the resource cost of these direct redistribution policies was not a major drag on growth because the government continued to maintain an outward oriented overall policy stance. Given that the trade and foreign investment regimes continued to remain open, and the government by and large continued to maintain its firm commitment to basic rules of 'good governance' (in particular maintaining macroeconomic stability, developing economic infrastructure, and preserving private property rights) there was ample room for the private sector to expand through greater integration in the global economy.
There was a heavy emphasis on the promotion of heavy industries through direct government involvement in the first half of 1980s, as part of the 'look East' policy of Dr Mahathir who became Prime Minister in 1981 (Chee 1994) . The Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), a public-sector holding company, was formed in 1980 to go into partnership with foreign companies in setting up industries in areas such as petrochemicals; iron and steel; cement; paper and paper products; machinery and equipment; general engineering; transport equipment; and building materials. The symbol of the selective industrial policy was the Proton (the Malaysian national car) project, which was set up by HICOM in collaboration with the Mitsubishi Corporation in Japan.
By 1987, there were 867 corporate public enterprises in Malaysia, more than a third of which were in manufacturing. Tariffs on a wide range of manufactured goods were increased in the first half of 1980s as part of the heavy-industrialisation move. But there was no significant reliance of quantitative import restrictions; only 8 percent of total merchandise imports (on an import-weighted basis) were under such restrictions by the mod-1980s (Menon 1999, Table 1 ). By the mid-1990s, only 3 percent of all import tariff lines (accounting for about 4.5 per cent of annual import value) were subject to licensing requirements.
The economic crisis during 1985-87, which originated in a combination of budget deficits caused by the heavy industrialisation move and adverse trends in prices of Malaysia's major export products (Corden 1996) , put an end to the state-led heavy 8 Most of these proposals -in particular those relating to the provision of infrastructure, maintaining macroeconomic stability, human capital development and commitment to a more equitable distribution of fruits of economic growth -simply 7 The economy-wide import-weighted tariff rate declined from 14.7 during 1984-87 to 8.7 per cent by the mid-1990s, the lowest in Southeast and South Asia (Menon 2000, Table 1 ; ADB 1997 p. 96). By the mid-1990s, only 3 percent of all import tariff lines (accounting for about 4.5 per cent of annual import value) were subject to licensing requirements. 8 Government programs and procedures for achieving these goals were embodied in the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and the Second Industrial Master Plan released in 1996.
reconfirm the long-standing commitment of the Malaysian government to good governance. However, the new policy also introduced a plethora of new incentives geared to industrial upgrading and strengthening domestic linkages of the manufacturing sectors, which opened up new opportunities for policy-maker desecration. However, the long-standing commitment to private-sector oriented growth in the context of an open trade and investment regime continued to remain the basic tenet of Malaysia's national development strategy.
(c ) Policy Response to the Financial Crisis
The impressive growth trajectory of Malaysia was shattered by the currency crisis in late 1997. The currency and stock market turmoil that began in July 1997 was quickly translated into economic collapse.
Unlike the other three crisis countries, Malaysia succumbed to the crisis with only a little foreign debt exposure of its banking system. For this reason, the Malaysian policy markers were able to face the crisis without entering into an IMF-sponsored rescue package. However, for almost one-and-a-half years following the onset of the crisis, policy indecisiveness seriously hampered the recovery process. It was difficult for the Malaysian authorities to mobilise foreign financing for crisis management because of the market perception that Malaysia would be less committed to the required reforms since it was not under an IMF program. To make matters worse, the massive private sector domestic bank debts in the lead-up to the crisis 9 , constrained the use the interest rate policy to support the exchange rate in face of continuing capital outflow. By mid-1998, the economy was in its worst recession during the post-independence era and there were no signs of achieving currency and share price stability.
In this volatile economic climate, the Malaysian government had to choose between two alternatives. The first was to obtain a 'good housekeeping seal' on its policies from the IMF. This would, like in Korea and Thailand, have stabilized the exchange rate, setting the stage for applying the Keynesian therapy to speed up the recovery. The second option was to embark on a capital-control based macroeconomic stimulation package; to insulate the domestic financial markets from short-term financial flows through capital controls with a view to enabling vigorous pursuance of monetary and fiscal expansion, and undertaking banking and corporate restructuring. The first alternative was not politically acceptable to the Malaysian leadership. Given the intimate links developed between business and government under the NEP program, naturally the positive stabilizing impact of any policy move had to be weighed against its potential negative effect on socio-political stability of the country (Crouch 1998) . Thus the Malaysian leadership opted for the second alternative, ending the policy uncertainty that had pervaded the policy scene for almost a year.
The purpose of capital outflow controls in the new policy package was to make it harder for short-term portfolio investors and offshore hedge funds to drive down the currency. Thus these controls were confined to short-term capital flows only. Following the format of the TPR we first discuss the broad sweep of trade policy focussing on the key instruments (measures), followed by a discussion of sectoral policies. Table 1 ). The average applied MFN tariff increased from 8.1%
a. Trade Policies and Practices by Measure
in 1997 to 9.2% in 2001 ( The degree of dispersion tariff rates measured by the coefficient of variation increased from 91% in 1988 to 170% in 1997 and then to 210% in 2001, reflecting the increase in the number of tariff lines with rates less than 10% and higher than 20% (Table   2) . By contrast, domestic tariff peaks (lines with tariff rates exceeding three times the simple average tariff rate as a percentage of total tariff lines) have declined. Tariff peaks apply, inter alia, to automobiles, beverages, textiles and clothing.
Malaysia bound only 65% of its tariff lines in 1995 and the bound list has remained unchanged during the ensuing years. Moreover the bound rates are much higher than the applied MFN rates. Both these features of the tariff structure have provides the government with scope to raise applied tariffs (as was done in 1998), imparting a degree of uncertainty to applied tariffs.
The increases in nominal tariff rates in recent years have largely been confined to products in final stage of processing (Table 2 ). Nearly 60% of total tariff lines, which relate mostly to inputs to domestic industry (that is, products in the first stage of processing and the semi-process products) continued to remain duty free. A large number of dutiable imported inputs also benefited from some tariff reductions. This cascading pattern of the tariff structure implies that the effective rate of protection enjoyed by domestic manufacturing would have considerably increased during the review period. Despite recent tariff increases Malaysia's average tariff rate is relatively low (both in terms of the simple average and import-weighted average) by the regional standards.
Malaysia is a founding member of the Association of the South East
However, the degree of dispersion of tariff in Malaysia (measured by the coefficient of variation) is relatively high because of high tariff peaks relating to a few product lines, motor vehicles in particular. (iii) Export Taxes and Subsidies Some primary products, notable forest products, crude oil, and selected palm oil products are subject to export duties. In 2000 these duties contributed to about 2% tax revenues. A few agricultural products are also subject to prohibitions, restraints, and licensing requirements.
There are no export duties on manufactured products. On the contrary, assistance is provided to manufactured exports through import tariff concessions, tax exceptions, export credit, export insurance and export credit guarantees, export promotion and marketing assistance. In addition Malaysia maintains two types of facilities for export processing with minimum customs formalities; licensed manufacturing warehouses and free zones. Malaysia is committed to phasing out these export subsidies in the manufacturing sector over eight years, to bring them in conformity with the WTO Agreement. Malaysia does not have a comprehensive competition law or other laws that regulate the activities of enterprises and protect consumer interest. However, the government has recently established some competition guidelines with a view to fostering competition in telecommunications. As part of corporate restructuring following the on-set of the crisis, the government also has taken some initiatives to improve corporate governance in Malaysia, including introducing disclosure requirements and monitoring insider share trading.
(b) Trade Policy by Sector
At the sectoral level, overall Malaysia maintains liberal agricultural policies, especially as far as non-tariff border measures are concerned. Generally speaking, import tariffs on agricultural products (HS chapters 01-24) are low, averaging 0.5% in 2001, if non-ad valorem duties are excluded. However, a wide range of agricultural imports is subject to import licensing.
Non-border measures, notably production subsides are also used to support domestic (non-plantation) agriculture. The total government outlay on these support measures amounted to RM 995 million in 1998 (the latest year for which data are available). The rice sector stands out as the single most assisted agricultural activity.
The government assists rice producers with a comprehensive fertilizer subsidy, a guaranteed minimum price and a price subsidy scheme. Poverty reduction and food security are often cited as the main rationale behind such policy. Under the guaranteed minimum price scheme, BERNAS (a privatised enterprise involved in state trading) undertakes to buy paddy from farmers at not less than the guaranteed minimum prices.
Under the paddy price subsidy scheme, the government makes fixed payments to farmers for the paddy sold by them to any commercial rice mills. Total expenditure in 1998 on the three schemes amounted to RM 547 million (US$ 150) or nearly 55% total production subsidies.
Import tariffs on mining products (including crude petroleum and gas) were eliminated in 1997. They are not subject to any import restrictions, except for barite, which requires import licence. Currently there is no export duty on petroleum products; while exports of crude oil and tin are subject to export duties at 10% and 0-25%, respectively.
The wholly state-owned company, PERTONAS (established under the Petroleum Development Act 1974) continues to be the main vehicle for the appropriation of resource rents from oil and gas; it has exclusive rights of ownership, exploration and production, and is responsible for planning, investment, and regulation of all activities relating to exploration of petroleum products. Foreign investment or participation in the upstream industry (processing and refining of petroleum and the manufacture of petrochemical products) is accepted in the form of production-sharing contracts (PSC);
by the end of 2000, PETRONAS had signed more that 60 PSCs with foreign companies.
Foreign equity participation up to 100% is permitted in the mining sector depending on the level of investments, technology and risk involved in the project, the availability of Malaysian expertise in the exploration and mining, and the level of domestic value added.
The total number of duty free import lines relating to manufactured imports increased from 4155 to 4336 between 1997 and 2001. Tariffs on selected manufactured goods have been reduced either on unilateral basis or under the WTO commitments.
However the average tariff rate for manufactured imports increased from 6.4% to 8.2%
because of increases in tariffs on automobiles, construction equipment, certain appliances and alcoholic beverages in 1998. As already noted, a number of manufactured goods are also subject to discretionary import licensing for public health, security as well as for protection purposes. Exports of manufactured products enjoy virtual free trade status through export duty exemptions, duty drawback facilities and free trade zone status.
Exports are also exempted from sales tax.
Heavy protection given to automobile industry remains a major anomaly in Malaysia's structure of industrial protection. The domestic automobile market is protected through both tariff and non-tariff measures. Following the latest increases in October 1997, currently automobile tariff range from 42% to 80% on completely knocked down (CKD) cars, and from 140% to 300% on completely built up (CBU) cars.
Most automobile parts and components, except tractor parts (duty free) are subject to 25-30% tariffs. Motor vehicles, chassis fitted with engine for automobiles and motor vehicles, chassis not fitted with engine and parts thereof, bodies for ambulances, and road tractors for semi-trailers are subject to discretionary import licensing. A number of internal taxes, such as tax sales tax at 10%, exercise tax at various rates, and road taxes based on engine capacity are imposed on all vehicles. The national cars, Proton and Perodua, receive 50% reduction in exercise tax. All assemblers and manufacturers including the two national car companies must source certain percentage of parts and components locally (WTO 2002, p. 77) . The Given heavy protection; domestic production naturally accounts for the lions' share (over 90%) of the domestic car market.
Despite various export incentives offered, exports of automobile products accounted for a mere 0.4% of total merchandise exports in 1999 (WTO 2002, p. 75 ).
Until 1998 full foreign ownership was allowed only in export-oriented manufacturing ventures. As part of new incentives offered for foreign investors following the onset of the financial crisis full foreign equity participation was allowed for newly approved on or before December 2000 (subsequently extended to December 2003).
However, activities that involve small and medium-sized enterprises, like paper packaging, plastic packaging, metal stamping and fabrication, wire harness, and printing excluded from this relaxation. Foreign equity participation in these industries is limited to 30% if the products are domestic-market oriented. There is evidence that, once the Malaysian authorities decided to deviate from the IMF route and followed the conventional Keynesian recipe for crisis management, capital controls did play a useful role in providing a conducive setting for the effective pursuance of such policies. Against the popular perception that short-term capital flows cannot be controlled in a highly trade oriented economy, the Malaysian evidence suggests these flows can be effectively regulated (at least on the margin), provided the controls are specifically targeted at capital account transactions (Ito 2000 , Athukorala 2001 , Corden 2002 . One can still disputes the argument that controls have played a 'special role' in delivering a superior recovery outcome for Malaysia (compared to the IMF-program countries) for want of counterfactuals. However, the fact remains that the new policy measures enabled Malaysia to achieve recovery while minimising social costs and economic disruptions associated with a more market-oriented path to reform. This itself is a significant achievement because maintaining social harmony is an overriding concern (quite apart from economic efficiency consideration) of economic policy making in ethically diverse Malaysia (Crouch 1998) .
The bulk of the discussion on the structure of trade protection in the TPR 2001 is on tariff barriers. In most cases the discussion on non-tariff barriers has not gone beyond a simple listing of the instruments and the commodities covered. For instance, it points to the recent increase in the reliance on import licensing, but there is little discussion of implications of these increases for Malaysia import trade and relative incentives for domestic industries. It is mentioned that licensing is 'non-automatic' without providing any evidence about the extent to which the administrative discretion is used to regulate trade flows. A close look at the commodity coverage of licensing suggests that a significant number of these products directly compete with domestic production by publici sector enterprises. It could well be that licensing is used in a more restrictive manner in these areas to protect government monopolies at the expense of the private sector.
It is reported that so far Malaysia has by and large shunned the use of antidumping procedures to as a new form of import protection. At first look, this is indeed a positive development. But it could well be that there is no need to rely on antidumping or other contingency measures as discretionary licensing act as a more effective However, its subject coverage is rather lopsided. Much of the Review is about tariffs.
The discussion on various non-tariff barriers (in particular non-discretionary licensing, which seems to have gained in importance in recent years), government procurement practices, export subsidies and agricultural production subsidies has not gone beyond providing a chronology of events and listing of policies. The overall discussion on recent policy changes in the TPR provides some clues about some notable deviation of Malaysia's trade policy stance from the country's pre-crisis commitment to trade liberalisation. But no attempt has been made to highlight these deviations, let alone analysing their socio-political underpinnings and economic implications. Nor is there any substantial assessment of the problems faced by Malaysia in meeting its remaining commitments under the WTO. 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-97 1997-2000 
